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Foreword
Non-Agricultural Market Access is one of the important items on the agenda of
the ongoing Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the WTO. In the past
rounds the contracting parties of the erstwhile GATT 1947 employed different techniques
in tariff negotiations such as request-offer or product-by product procedures, linear or
harmonization formula approach, or  sectorial harmonization or elimination. These
techniques are known as modalities of negotiations. As in the past, Members would need
to decide on the modalities before they can proceed with the negotiations in the current
round.
During the discussions in the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market
Access a number of suggestions have been given on the modalities. The Chairman of the
Negotiating Group has also submitted a comprehensive proposal for the consideration of
Members. Members had earlier agreed that they would decide on the modalities by 31
May 2003, but differences prevented an accord before the deadline. The decision would
be crucial for breaking the logjam that has been created in the Doha Round following the
collapse of the Fifth Ministerial Session at Cancun.
India was initially a reluctant participant but by the time of the Fifth Ministerial
Session held at Cancun in September 2003 appeared ready to engage in these
negotiations. In future negotiations India would have to take a decision on the best way to
advance its interest in the eventual choice that is made by the Members in respect of the
modalities in the area.
The authors have taken the view that there are good reasons for India to be
ambitious in its outlook and proactive in approaching the negotiations. India has
liberalized its tariffs at a pace that seemed unthinkable before the onset of economic
reforms. There is harmony in the views of the political executive and economists that the
trend must be maintained. India has a large repertoire of concessions that it can trade for
getting reciprocal concessions in return. Further in the context of the wave of regional
integration arrangements that is sweeping across the world, steep reduction in the non-
discriminatory tariffs is the only way in which non-participants in major regional
arrangements can alleviate the trade diversion effect of preferential arrangements. As for
modalities the authors recommend that a non-linear formula which attaches weight to the
tariff average of the country concerned would be in India’s best interest. They advocate
that if participation in sectorial liberalization is to be mandatory, India must ask for the
possibility for developing countries to retain the flexibility to set the tariff at five per cent.
The authors do not favor placing great reliance on the concept of special and differential
treatment. This concept served the developing countries well in the past when the main
motivation was to fend off pressures for tariff reduction by them.   However, it is a poor
instrument for extracting concessions from the developed country partners.
It is hoped that the Working Paper would be helpful to the policy-makers, the
business community and other interested persons to take a view on what is in India’s best
interest in the negotiations in this area.







Market access in non-agricultural products is one of the important areas of
negotiations on the agenda of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
1 These
negotiations encompass both tariff and non-tariff barriers, and are to take place in
accordance with the modalities to be agreed. The deadline for reaching an agreement on
the modalities was initially fixed for 31 May 2003. However, the deadline was missed on
account of disagreements among Members
2 and an accord also eluded the Fifth
Ministerial Session of the WTO held at Cancun in September 2003. In any future attempt
to resume the negotiations in the area finding a basis for agreement on the modalities will
have to be the starting point.
What does the term “modalities” denote in the context of tariff negotiations? In
the WTO Agreement, as in GATT 1947,
3 the Member governments are mandated to enter
into negotiations periodically for the reduction of tariffs “on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis”. The relevant article
4 states further that these negotiations “may be
carried out on a selective product-by-product basis or by the application of such
multilateral procedures as may be accepted” by the Members concerned. In past
negotiations, governments have carried out negotiations on a product-by-product basis or
have agreed to adopt a formula for reducing tariffs. They have also employed other tools
or techniques for this purpose. The term modality refers to these methods used in tariff
negotiations. The application of these methods also involves an agreement on several
other aspects such as base rates (the tariff level taken as the base for applying the agreed
                                                                
1  The WTO Agreement contains a definition of agricultural products, which includes a number of
manufactured products as well, such as manufactured food products. At the same time, the definition
excludes fish and fish products. The Negotiating Group on Market Access covers all products not
included in the definition of agricultural products.
2  The States and separate customs territories that are members of the WTO are referred to in the WTO
Agreement as Members.
3  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiated in 1947 entered into force on I
January 1948. After 47 years of independent existence, GATT became a part of the WTO Agreement in
1995, along with the improvements made during its period of operation and further improvements made
during the Uruguay Round. The GATT in its original form is known as GATT 1947, and in the form in
which it was assimilated into the WTO Agreement it is known as GATT 1994.
4  GATT 1994, Article XXVIII bis.2
reduction) and staging (the period over which the tariff reduction would be phased). All
these and other related aspects are covered by the term “modalities”.
A great deal of discussion has already taken place in the current round on the
modalities and a number of proposals have been made on the subject. The objective of
this paper is to facilitate the process of development of the position that would be in the
best interest of India to take in future discussion on the modalities for tariff negotiations.
The paper is divided into five parts. Part II analyses the WTO rules relating to tariff
negotiations and the past practice. Part III describes the proposals on modalities made
initially by Members in the current negotiations and also analyses those made by the
Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market Access and others in the
run up to the Fifth Ministerial Session of the WTO. Part IV discusses the considerations
that should determine India’s approach towards these negotiations.  Part V makes
recommendations on the position that would be in the best interest of India to take in the
negotiations on modalities. Finally, Part VI summarises the conclusions.
II  WTO Rules and Past Practice in Tariff Negotiations
II.1  WTO Rules Relating to Tariffs and Tariff Negotiations
II.1.1  Tariffs and tariff negotiations in the WTO
The WTO Agreement allows Members to use “duties, taxes or other charges” for
regulation of trade without stipulating the general or specific levels of tariff that Members
can maintain. It, however, encourages them to periodically enter into rounds of tariff
negotiations “directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other
charges on imports and exports and in particular to the reduction of such high tariffs as
discourage the importation even of minimum quantities”.
5 As mentioned earlier, the
WTO Agreement leaves it to Members to decide whether the negotiations should be
carried out on a selective product-by-product basis or by the application of “multilateral
procedures”. It envisages that the negotiations could result in the reduction of duties, the
binding of duties at existing levels, or commitments not to raise duties on particular
                                                                
5  GATT 1994, Article XXVIII bis, paragraph 1.3
products beyond specified levels. It stipulates further that “ [t]he binding against increase
of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall, in principle, be recognised as a concession
equivalent in value to the reduction of high duties”.
6
II.1.2  Principle of reciprocity and concept of non-reciprocity
A central requirement of GATT 1994 is that negotiations be held on a reciprocal
and mutually advantageous basis. There is no provision on the manner in which
reciprocity should be measured and the understanding has been that governments
participating in negotiations have freedom to adopt any method for evaluating the
concessions. In the 1960s, the concept of non-reciprocity came to be recognised for trade
negotiations between developed and developing countries. This concept was later
explained to mean that in the exchange of concessions during negotiations the developing
countries would be expected to make concessions that were consistent with their
individual development and financial and trade needs rather than none at all.
II.1.3  Renegotiations
Once negotiations have been concluded, Members cannot modify or withdraw the
tariff concession, except after entering into re-negotiations with the Members with whom
the initial negotiations were held and with those Members who have a principal
supplying interest. Consultations have also to be held with Members who have a
substantial interest in such concessions. In such re-negotiations or consultations, the
Member seeking modification or withdrawal is expected to give compensatory
concessions on other products. If agreement is not reached, the Member may still go
ahead with the proposed changes, but the affected Members get the right to withdraw
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the Member making the
change. There may be three categories of “affected Members”, viz., those with initial
negotiating rights (INRs), principal supplying interest, and substantial supplier interest.
Members with INRs are those with whom the specific tariff concession was negotiated at
an earlier round or during subsequent re-negotiations. Members with the largest share of
                                                                
6  GATT 1994, Article XXVIII bis, paragraph 2(a).4
imports in a particular product are deemed to be having a principal supplying interest
with respect to that product and those with a share of 10 per cent or more are considered
to have substantial supplying interest.
II.1.4  Principle of non-discrimination
By virtue of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause of GATT 1994, a WTO
Member has not only to treat all other Members equally but also has also to extend to
each of them the best treatment it accords to any trading partner. An important element of
the obligation is that the extension of any concession or favour to all Members has to be
immediate and unconditional. All tariff concessions made by Members during the course
of negotiations and renegotiations have to be extended to all other Members on a non-
discriminatory basis. It follows that all modifications and withdrawals of tariff
concessions, including retaliatory withdrawals, must be applied on a non-discriminatory
basis. There are some exceptions to the MFN rule, the most important one being tariff
concessions extended under regional trading arrangements.
II.1.5  Implications of tariff commitments
After tariff negotiations are concluded the results are incorporated in the
schedules of concessions of the Member concerned, which are lodged with the WTO
Secretariat. Once a tariff concession has been entered into the schedule of a Member, the
most important implication is that there is a commitment not to apply customs duty upon
the importation of the product above the level indicated in the schedule. The tariff level is
thus “bound” against an increase. The binding against increase affects not only the basic
customs duty but also “other duties or charges of any kind”  (ODCs). As a broad
definition of ODCs it has been accepted that only those levies that discriminate against
imports are covered, e.g. stamp duty, development tax, revenue duty, etc. During the
Uruguay Round, it was agreed that all ODCs would be recorded in the schedules of
concessions against the tariff item to which they apply. If no ODCs are shown in the
schedule against a particular tariff item, it is presumed to be zero. This obligation applies5
to the Uruguay  Round and future negotiations, and the position regarding  ODCs in
respect of concessions negotiated in earlier negotiations is more complex.
Internal taxes, anti-dumping, or countervailing duties and fees or other charges
commensurate with the cost of services rendered are not affected by the level at which
concessions have been bound during negotiations. Thus, a Member is entitled to impose
on imports charges that are equivalent to an internal tax such as excise duty. Tariff
commitments have an implication also for the pricing practices of import monopolies.
The mark-up on the price of products imported by an import monopoly must not afford
protection to domestic goods above the level provided by the tariff commitment.
II.2  Modalities Adopted in Past Negotiations
Eight tariff conferences and rounds of multilateral trade negotiations were held
under the auspices of GATT 1947 between 1947 and 1994 within the legal framework
outlined earlier.  These were the Geneva Tariff Conference (1947), the  Annecy Tariff
Conference (1949), the Torquay Tariff Conference (1950–51), the Geneva Tariff
Conference (1956), the Geneva Tariff Conference (1960–61), also known as the Dillon
Round, the Kennedy Round (1964–67), the Tokyo Round (1973–79), and the Uruguay
Round (1986–94). The modalities adopted during these negotiations are summarised
below. In this summary of past practice we deal only with some broad aspects, such as
the main negotiating tool used for the reduction of tariff, the measurement of reciprocity,
and special and differential treatment of developing countries. A number of other aspects
are also relevant, but past practice on those aspects has not been described in the interest
of brevity. We shall take up these aspects when we deal with the proposed modalities in
the current Round.
II.2.1  The early rounds
The rules and modalities of the first three rounds of negotiations had the
following common elements:
The negotiations were to be conducted on a selective product-by-product basis;
The requests for reduction of tariff on a product could be made in principle
only in respect of products of which the requesting countries were individually6
or collectively the principal suppliers to the countries from which the concessions
were asked;
Each participating country had the full flexibility on granting concessions on
individual products; it was free not to grant concessions on individual products;
or if chose to grant a concession, it could reduce the duty or bind it at the existing
or a specified higher level;
The binding against increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment was in
principle recognised as a concession equivalent in value to the substantial
reduction of high duties or the elimination of preferences;
The negotiations were to proceed strictly on the basis of reciprocity and no
government was to be required to grant unilateral concessions, or to grant
concessions to other governments without receiving adequate concessions in
return. (Hoda 2001)
The selective product-by-product technique was also adopted as the modality for
the 1956 Geneva Tariff Conference. In the Dillon Round, also the governments chose to
adhere to the bilateral item-by-item negotiating procedures.
II.2.2  Kennedy Round
In the Kennedy Round, for industrial products the selective product-by-product
technique was replaced by linear tariff reduction, and the working hypothesis adopted for
the rate of reduction was 50 per cent. Exceptions to the application of the rate of
reduction agreed as the working hypothesis were not ruled out, but such exceptions were
to be kept to a bare minimum, justified on the basis of overriding national interest. The
selective product-by-product technique continued to apply for agricultural products.
Two main reasons led to the adoption of the linear approach. First, the selective
item-by-item technique adopted in the past had led to very small reductions, as the
negotiations depended on the extent to which the principal supplier was willing to
reciprocate the reduction of duty in a particular product. Second, the increase in the
number of governments participating in the negotiations had made the process
cumbersome and unwieldy.7
On account of the recognition of the concept of non-reciprocity in negotiations
between the developing and developed countries, the adopted modality applied only to
the developed countries.
II.2.3  Tokyo Round
In the Tokyo Round, the developed countries agreed at the outset to conduct
negotiations on tariffs by employing a formula of as general application as possible. The
general sentiment was that there should be an agreement on a formula that would result in
harmonisation, i.e. higher the duty, larger the reduction. While a number of
harmonisation formulae were proposed the ultimate agreement was on the Swiss formula,
which was Z= AX/ (A+X), where coefficient A = 14 or 16, X= initial rate of duty, and Z=
resulting rate of duty. Governments were given the option to adopt 14 or 16 as the
coefficient, the latter resulting in slightly lower reductions. As in the Kennedy Round,
participant governments made exceptions in the application of the formula to some
product areas, but in lieu of this they undertook deeper reductions in other products. As in
the Kennedy Round, the formula was not followed by the developing countries at all and
the developed countries also did not apply it to agricultural products. A number of
developed countries that were signatories to the Agreement on Civil Aircraft agreed to
also eliminate tariffs on civil aircraft.
II.2.4  Uruguay Round
In the Uruguay Round, the US advocated that a request–offer approach should be
followed, while some other developed countries spelt out details of a formula approach
that they proposed as the principal modality.
v  The EC made the following proposal
q  For reduction of duties by the industrialised and more advanced
developing countries:
¤  base rate of 40% or higher: reduction to ceiling of 20%
¤  base rate of less than 40%: reduction on the following basis:
•  rates between 0 and 29%8
R=D plus 20 (where R is the percentage reduction
and D the base rate of customs duty)
•  rates between 30% and 40%
R=50
q  For other developing countries excluding the least-developed the EC
proposed the following approach:
¤  base rate of more than 35%: reduction to ceiling of 35%
¤  base rate of 35% or less: possibility of bilateral negotiations
with a view to reducing and harmonising the rate of duty.
q  For the least developed countries the EC proposed that they would
make contributions to the limits of their capabilities.
v  Initially  Japan proposed elimination of tariffs on all industrial products.
Subsequently it proposed that developed countries eliminate tariff on a certain
proportion of their tariff lines. Tariffs that were not eliminated were to be
subject to reduction under a harmonisation formula such as the one used in the
Tokyo Round.
v  Canada suggested the adoption of the following formula:
R=32 plus D/5, where R is the rate of reduction and D is the base
rate. In performing the calculation D/5 the result had to be rounded off to
the next full number and the maximum figure for R was to be 38 per cent.










, where Z= final duty and X= initial duty.
The conflicting approaches on modalities remained unresolved until the end but at
the mid-term review meeting held at Montreal a basis was found for making
progress in tariff negotiations. An agreement was reached at that meeting on ‘a
target amount for overall reductions at least as ambitious as that achieved by the9
formula participants in the Tokyo Round’. This translated into the target amount
of overall reductions by one-third (33 1/3 per cent).  It was left to each participant
to determine the manner in which it would reach the overall target of reduction. In
making their offers, most developed countries used a formula proposed during the
negotiations, but the US stuck to its approach of following the request–offer item-
by-item technique. Although in principle the target for overall reduction applied
to the developing countries as well, the expectation from them was mainly for
increasing the coverage of bindings in their tariff schedules. The agreement at
Montreal included the general principle that there would be ‘(A) a substantial
increase in the scope of bindings, including bindings at ceiling levels, so as to
provide greater security and predictability in international trade’.
Towards the end of the negotiations, the four major developed countries Canada,
Japan, the EC (12) and the US also agreed on several new ways of reducing their tariffs.
First, they agreed to eliminate tariffs in 10 products or product groups (sectors), viz.,
agricultural equipment, beer, construction equipment, distilled spirits (brown), furniture,
medical equipment, paper, pharmaceuticals, steel, and toys. Second, they also agreed on
harmonisation of chemical tariffs, whereby tariffs in certain headings were eliminated
while for certain others they were reduced to 5.5–6.5 per cent. Third, for tariffs above 15
per cent (peak tariffs), they agreed to negotiate for a reduction of 50 per cent. Fourth, for
other tariffs they agreed to reduce by an average of one-third at least, reducing in certain
cases by more than 50 per cent.
The negotiations for reduction of peak tariffs and for reduction of other tariffs
from one-third to 50 per cent and beyond were only partially successful. However, the
negotiations for elimination and harmonisation of tariffs in the sectors enumerated above
were fully successful. While the four major developed economies joined all the sector
initiatives, other developed countries were selective. Norway joined only for seven
sectors (excluding beer, paper and toys), and Switzerland only five leaving out distilled
spirits (brown) and steel as well. Australia joined only for beer and pharmaceuticals and
New Zealand for paper and pharmaceuticals. Norway and Switzerland joined the tariff10
harmonisation initiative on chemicals but Australia and New Zealand did not.  Among
developing country Members, only Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore agreed to the
elimination of duties in most but not all of these sectors. There was no insistence on other
developing countries to accept the  sectorial initiatives on a mandatory basis.
Nevertheless, except in the case of toys in which the dominant exporting country, China,
was not yet a Member of the WTO, Members accounting for a major share (60 per cent
or more) of the world export or import trade joined the agreement and eliminated or
harmonised the duties in the sector.
The target for overall reduction applied only to non-agricultural products. For
agricultural products, altogether different yardsticks were used. As the initial step, all
countries were required to convert their non-tariff measures into customs duties.
Thereafter, all customs duties, including those resulting from conversion of non-tariff
measures, had to be reduced by a simple average of 36 per cent.  There was to be a
minimum rate of reduction of 15 per cent for each tariff line. For developing countries,
the rate of reduction was 24 per cent, with a minimum reduction of 10 per cent for each
tariff line.
II.2.5  After the Uruguay Round
About two years after the establishment of the WTO a group of developed and
developing countries took an initiative for eliminating customs duties and other duties
and charges on six categories of information technology products. These categories were
computers, telecommunication products, semiconductors, and semiconductor
manufacturing equipment, software, and scientific instruments. A unique feature of the
modalities adopted for the negotiation of the Information Technology Agreement was
that the Agreement was to become effective when participants representing
approximately 90 per cent of trade in these products had accepted the agreement. As in
the case of the sector agreements during the Uruguay Round, it was thus ensured that the
major beneficiaries of the agreement also eliminated tariffs themselves. The critical mass
for making the Information Technology Agreement operational was pitched at a level
higher than what had been done in the sector agreements during the Uruguay Round.11
II.3  Reciprocity and its Measurement
As stated earlier the principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the negotiating
framework of the WTO Agreement. It has also been indicated that the rules do not
specify how reciprocity is to be measured. However, the practice during past negotiations
under the GATT throws some light on the subject.
When negotiations were held on the basis of the request–offer item-by-item
technique, reciprocity was a function of two factors, viz., trade coverage and depth of
tariff reduction. These two factors remained the basic criteria in later negotiations as well.
However, when linear and formula approaches were adopted, complementary techniques
were also employed to establish reciprocity. In the Kennedy Round, for determining
reciprocity with trading partners, participants took into account the average reduction in
dutiable products or the trade coverage of the working hypothesis of 50 per cent
reduction or the extent of exceptions to linear reduction in respect of products of export
interest to them. Where the offer was for reduction by less than the working hypothesis of
50 per cent, the offers on dutiable tariffs were converted to the equivalent of 50 per cent
tariff reduction. During the Tokyo Round, when participants made exceptions to the
application of the agreed formula in respect of some products, they were required to
make deeper cuts in other products in order to maintain a reciprocal balance.
Although statistical methods were largely used to determine reciprocity during
negotiations, in the internal assessments of the value of tariff concessions made by
trading partners numerous other factors were used to evaluate the balance of concessions.
These were existence of non-tariff measures, the height of duties, demand and supply
elasticity, the size and nature of markets, etc. In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds,
participating countries insisted sometimes not only on global reciprocity in bilateral trade
but also on reciprocity in specific product groups. In the Tokyo Round, reciprocity in
tariff negotiations was only a part of the equation in the broader negotiations that covered
non-tariff measures as well. In the Uruguay Round, reciprocity in tariff negotiations
became somewhat less significant in the context of more comprehensive negotiations that12
encompassed services and intellectual property rights as well. But it did not disappear
altogether and remained important in its own right. In the sector initiatives for elimination
or harmonisation of tariff, the participants ensured that there was broad-based
participation by other producers and exporters. In the case of the Information Technology
Agreement, participants sought to achieve reciprocity through the critical mass
requirement, i.e. by making it a condition that the Agreement would become effective
only after participants with a share of 90 per cent of world trade had accepted it.
II.4  Developing Countries in Past Negotiations
In the first five rounds, developing countries participated in the negotiations with
developed countries as equal partners and exchanged concessions with them on the basis
of reciprocity. However, with the recognition of the concept of non-reciprocity in the
mid-1960s, the level of their engagement in tariff negotiations was very low during the
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. During the Kennedy Round, they were not called upon to
participate in the linear reduction of tariff. They were exhorted to make at their discretion
a general contribution to the overall objective of trade liberalisation. Only some of them
made concessions in response to the exhortation from the developed countries, and these
too were minimal in significance. During the Tokyo Round also, the developing countries
were not asked to adopt the formula for the reduction of industrial tariffs. But the mood
of the developed countries towards the more advanced developing countries was more
demanding than in the Kennedy Round. During this round, the concept of non-reciprocity
in trade negotiations between the developing and developed countries was broadened into
the comprehensive principle of special and differential (S & D) treatment of developing
countries in all areas of negotiations. But in the process, the notion of graduation of
developing countries was also introduced, whereby the more advanced developing
countries were asked to undertake greater tariff commitments. Several of them had to
make tariff concessions in response to requests, particularly from the US.
During the Uruguay Round, the developing countries continued to benefit from
special and differential treatment, of which the concept of non-reciprocity was a subset.
They were not expected to subscribe to the generally agreed target of one-third for overall13
reduction of industrial tariff, but instead they were asked to increase the coverage of tariff
commitments. While increasing the level of bindings they were also allowed to undertake
ceiling bindings whereby the bound level was higher than the current applied rates. In
agriculture, as we have seen, they were asked to reduce average tariffs by a lower
percentage, but the coverage of their bindings had to be comprehensive.
The Uruguay Round witnessed a sea change in the attitude of the developing
countries towards tariff negotiations. Many of them had reduced their external trade
barriers in the context of wide-ranging economic reforms undertaken since the Tokyo
Round. They were keen on fuller participation in the tariff negotiations, without insisting
too much on the concept of non-reciprocity. Even though they were under no pressure to
subscribe to the overall reduction of tariffs by one-third agreed at the mid-term review
meeting, they made generous tariff concessions and some of them (such as Korea and
India) even exceeded the target. Indeed, the concessions made by them were quite
substantial, especially when judged against the commitments made by them in past
negotiations. Table 1 shows the extent to which some important developing countries
made commitments to reduce tariffs in the Uruguay Round.












Source:  GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
November 1994.
The contribution of the developing countries was even more impressive in respect
of the increase in coverage of tariff bindings in industrial products, as can be seen from
Table 2.14
Table 2: Scope of bindings in industrial products for selected developing countries:












Source:  GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
November 1994.
III  The Doha Mandate And Proposals Made Thereunder
III.1  The Doha Ministerial Declaration on Negotiations on Non-agricultural Tariffs
The WTO Agreement had itself provided that another round of negotiations in the
areas of agriculture and services should begin in 2000. While the WTO Agreement
envisages that Members must enter into tariff negotiations periodically, no specific
decision had been taken in respect of products other than agricultural products. In the run
up to the Seattle and Doha Ministerial Meetings of the WTO, an issue had arisen whether
the agenda should be made more comprehensive by including, inter alia, market access
negotiations on non-agricultural products. A number of countries including India opposed
the inclusion of market access on non-agricultural products for a long time but eventually
the following paragraph was agreed in the Doha Declaration:
“We agree to negotiations which shall aim, by modalities to be agreed, to reduce
or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks,
high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products
of export interest to developing countries. Product coverage shall be comprehensive and
without a priori exclusions. The negotiations shall take fully into account the special
needs and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including15
through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994 and the provisions cited in
paragraph 50 below. To this end, the modalities to be agreed will include appropriate
studies and capacity-building measures to assist least-developed countries to participate
effectively in the negotiations.”
Paragraph 50 refers to the various instruments agreed to in the past in the GATT
and the WTO on special and differential treatment of developing countries.
III.2  Proposals made by Members on Modalities during the Doha Round
Following the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001, intensive discussions
took place in the Negotiating Group on Market Access with a view to reaching an
agreement on modalities by the target date of 31 May that had been fixed for finalising
the modalities. Several Members had made proposals on the subject until the end of
January 2003, on 5 February the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market Access
circulated an overview of these proposals. On 16 May 2003 the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group submitted a draft of the ‘Elements of Modalities for Negotiations on
Non-Agricultural Products’ (TN/MA/W/35) to facilitate an agreement among Members
and on 19 August 2003 he circulated a revised version (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1). The run up
to the Fifth Ministerial Meeting at Cancun saw the appearance of a joint Canada-EC-US
paper, which, as we shall see later, left many of the elements of modalities unspecified.
The Draft Ministerial Declaration submitted by the Mexican Minister  Derbez
(JOB(03)/150/Rev.2 dated 13 September 2003) attempted to paper over the
disagreements on the modalities. While differences on the Singapore issues and
agriculture were the main reasons for the collapse of the Ministerial Meeting, agreement
was not in sight in Non-Agricultural Market Access as well at the time the Meeting was
closed. We first consider the important issues raised initially in the proposals made by
Members and then take up an analysis of the draft elements proposed by the Chairman on
the Negotiating Group as well as the subsequent texts and submissions. .16
III.2.1 Elimination of non-agricultural tariffs
The choice among the three main negotiating tools or modalities (formula,
elimination, or harmonisation by sector or request–offer procedures) becomes less
significant in the context of proposals made by the US (TN/MA/W/18) and Hong Kong
(China)(TN/MA/W/12) for across-the-board elimination of non-agricultural tariffs by all
or a subset of Members. However, the US proposal involved the use of both a
harmonisation formula and sector approach in the process of elimination of all non-
agricultural tariffs.  It envisaged that the five steps outlined below would be taken the
first four being applied between 2005 and 2010 and the fifth between 2010 and 2015. For
developing countries, a differentiated treatment was envisaged but not spelt out in clear
terms.
§  Elimination by 2010 of tariffs on all products with tariffs at or below 5 per cent ad
valorem.
§  For all other tariffs above 5 per cent, application of a harmonising Swiss formula
with a coefficient of eight. By this formula, Final Rate = (Initial Rate x 8)/ (Initial
Rate + 8).
§  As soon as possible but no later than 2010, elimination of tariffs in the Uruguay
Round zero-for-zero sectors, in addition to tariffs covered by the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) and the Agreement on Civil Aircraft (ATCA).
§  As soon as possible but no later than 2010, elimination of tariffs in the following
additional sectors and others, as agreed by Members: wood products, non-ferrous
metals, bicycle parts, certain chemicals and allied products including soda ash and
photographic film, electronics, fish and fish products, scientific equipment, and
environmental goods.
§  Complete elimination of remaining tariffs by 2015 through linear cuts.
Hong Kong (China) proposed that developed and developing countries must first
undertake to make a one-off reduction immediately upon the conclusion of the Doha
Round, the cut being lower for developing countries. Thereafter, the developed countries
must undertake to reduce tariffs further by equal annual cuts until all tariffs were
eliminated within a specified period. As for developing countries, the commitment must17
be to apply further tariff cuts over a longer time frame, on the basis of a common overall
target.
III.2.2 Choice of modality or negotiating tool
(a)  The formula approach
 Several Members emphasised that reliance must be placed on a harmonisation
formula as the central negotiating tool. Some of them refer to the Swiss formula, without
specifying the coefficient to be used. As mentioned earlier, only the US had proposed
(TN/MA/W/18) the use of the coefficient of eight in the Swiss formula for arriving at the
intermediate level of tariff before all tariffs were finally eliminated. Thus, the formula











 The application of the US formula would have resulted in the final tariff not
exceeding 8 per cent, irrespective of the level of the base level of tariffs.
In the scheme proposed by the US, initial tariffs that were less than five per cent
would also be eliminated at the intermediate stage.
 There were five other proposals, including the one made by India that suggested
adoption of a specific formula, as indicated below.
Japan  has proposed (TN/MA/S/3/Rev.2) that the reduction of tariff should be
made by setting a target level of a trade-weighted average tariff rate for each Member


















a t0  was the weighted tariff average prior to the application of the formula and 
w
a t1
was  the weighted tariff average after the application of the formula.  A was a constant
whose value varied as follows:
w
a t0 £ 10%,  A = 10,
10% < 
w
a t0  £ 20%,  A = 20,
20% < 
w
a t0  £ 30%,  A = 30,
30% < 
w
a t0 ,  A = 40.
a was proposed as a constant equal to 0.3.
 According to the proposal, each Member would have had flexibility on ways to
realise the target tariff level. Thus the formula could not be applied to individual tariff
lines.
Korea had proposed (TN/MA/W/6/Add.1) that the modalities should take into
account the current tariff structures of Members as these reflected their respective levels
of development. Each Member was required to reduce its trade-weighted average tariff
by 40 per cent, with the tariff on each product being reduced by not less than 20 per cent.
For those products whose current bound tariff rates were above either each concerned
Member’s current simple national average tariff rate or 25 per cent, the tariff rates were
to be reduced by more than 20 per cent. The formula thus factored in the national tariff
average or the existence of tariff rates above 25 per cent in applying the reduction to the
higher tariff rates. The following formula was proposed for tariff rates that were above
two times the national average but less than 25 per cent:
T1=(T0*0.8)-0.7*(T0-2*Ta),19
where,
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction;
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 2 times the national average); and
Ta: national average tariff rate.
A similar formula was proposed for tariff rates above 25 per cent but less than
twice the national average:
T1= (T0*0.8)-0.7*(T0-25),
Where,
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction;
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 25 per cent).
If the tariff rate was above two times the national average but at the same time
above 25 per cent, the final tariff rate was required to be the lower of the rates resulting
from the application of the above two formulae.
The  European Communities proposed (TN/MA/W/11/Add.1 and Add.2) that
WTO Members agree to reduce all tariff duties considerably by compressing them into a
flatter range, within which tariff peaks and high tariffs are eliminated. The application of
such a compression mechanism would result in considerably reduced tariff rates with a
limited dispersion. The formula was to be applied over a set of tariff intervals and the
tariff rate cuts depended upon the lower and upper limits of the relevant interval. The
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Interval 1 0 to less than     2 0 to       0
Interval 2 2 to                  15 1.6 to    7.5
Interval 3 15 to                  50 7.5 to     15
Interval 4 50 to more than 50 15 to     15
The People’s Republic of China  proposed (TN/MA/W/20) a harmonisation
formula linked to the average tariff rate. The objective was to achieve greater reduction
where the tariff rate was higher than the average tariff rate and less reduction where it
was lower than the average. The following formula was proposed:
,
where
T0  Base rate;
T1  Final rate;
A   Simple average of base rates;
P   Peak factor, P=T0/A;
B   Adjusting coefficient, e.g. for the year 2010, B=3; for the year 2015, B=1.
  India also proposed (TN/MA/W/10/Add.2) a formula for adoption by the
developed countries and also by the developing countries with some adjustments. It21
proposed a two-step approach, of which the first step involved a simple percentage cut of
the bound tariffs of each Member, with a higher percentage set for developed countries
than for the developing countries. In the second step, Members were to be required to
ensure that no individual tariff in the final commitment was in excess of three times the
average tariff of the final schedule. The following was the proposed formula:




1 ( 1 - = ;
Step 2  : TF  = TF1 or 3*TA  whichever is less,
where
A  = less than full reciprocity parameter =
Y  = Reduction percentage (to be negotiated);
O T = Present bound tariff on an individual tariff line;
1 F T = Reduced tariff after Step 1 on the individual tariff line;
TA = Simple average tariff after Step 1;
F T = Final bound tariff on the individual tariff line.
India did not make a definite proposal regarding the reduction percentage but its
submission mentioned, on an illustrative basis, the figures of 50 and 45 per cent for
general application and 33.33 and 30 per cent for developing countries.
A part of the Indian proposal was that developing countries must have the
flexibility to bind 15 per cent of the tariff lines at a higher level, provided that the overall
percentage was achieved (obviously by making deeper reductions in other tariff lines).
(b)  The sector approach
A number of Members have proposed harmonisation or elimination of duty on
sector basis as an additional tool. The idea was that tariffs would be eliminated or
harmonised if a critical mass of Members (accounting for say 80 per cent of world trade
share) joined the initiative. Reference has already been made to the sectors proposed by
A = 1 for developed countries and
A = 0.67 for developing countries;22
the US for tariff elimination in the first phase by 2010.  Japan also proposed
(TN/MA/W/15 and TN/TE/W/17) that  sectorial harmonisation or elimination should
cover the following products: consumer electrical products, bicycles, rubber and articles
thereof, glass and articles thereof, ceramic products, cameras, watches, toys, electrical
machinery parts, titanium and articles thereof, motor vehicles, textiles and clothing,
machine tools, construction equipment, bearing, certain articles of iron or steel, and
paper. For textiles and clothing, the suggestion was for harmonisation, with substantial
reduction of tariffs, and for motor vehicles the idea was that zero-for-zero must be
adopted by Members with a mature automobiles industry. Japan was not in favour of
elimination of duty in the fishery or forestry sectors.
A number of Members were in favour of taking up environmental goods for
elimination or reduction of tariffs, in view of the importance that all Members attached to
the protection of the environment. There was considerable divergence of view, however,
on what constituted an environmental good. Japan proposed a large list of products
including a number of consumer durable goods, claiming that their use had a favourable
impact on the environment.
There were proposals also for expanding the list of product lines as well as the list
of Members of the existing harmonisation and zero-for-zero agreements.
(c)  The request–offer approach
A comparatively smaller number of Members suggested that the request–offer
procedure be used to supplement and complement the use of other modalities.
III.2.3 Tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and high tariffs
A number of Members sought a definition of tariff peaks, but only a few proposed
a definition of such peaks. It is obvious that the application of all the proposed
harmonisation formulae, including the Swiss formula, would lead to the greater reduction
of high tariffs than other tariffs and would also extenuate the problem of tariff escalation.23
In addition, some Members proposed the idea of a cap or ceiling tariff level. India
proposed that Members must not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three times
their national average, after effecting the reductions. China suggested that a tariff peak
must be defined as a tariff rate three times more than the simple average tariff level of
that Member.
III.2.4 Coverage of bindings
The Doha Ministerial Declaration speaks of comprehensive product coverage in
the negotiations on market access for non-agricultural products, and a number of
Members stressed that the negotiations must result in full coverage. The EC proposed a
substantial increase in the scope of bindings, the objective being to “bring about a
situation where all WTO Members other than the least developed countries have as close
to 100 per cent bindings as possible” (TN/MA/W/11). India proposed that developing
countries must have the freedom to leave unbound up to 10 per cent of the tariff lines that
were hitherto unbound and were considered sensitive or strategically important. India
also suggested that developing countries must have the flexibility to bind hitherto
unbound tariffs at the highest of the bound rates in the tariff schedule of that country or at
the applied rate on a cut-off date (not defined).
III.2.5 Base rates
If reduction of tariff has to take place on the basis of an agreement on the extent
of reduction, clearly the base rate becomes important. The GATT/WTO practice has been
that where a tariff line has been bound in earlier negotiations, the bound rate is the base
rate. Most Members favour continuing the same approach. A few Members, including the
United States, suggested that where the current applied rate was lower than the bound
rate, the applied rate must become the base rate.
As to the tariff lines in which there is no binding, the general practice is to make
the applied rate at the commencement of negotiations the base rate for applying the24
agreed reduction. In line with this practice, some Members proposed that the applied rate
in 2001 or 2002 should be the base rate.
There were other aspects of the proposals that are also relevant in the context of
the discussion of the base rates, particularly in respect of items where the rates have not
been bound. There seemed to be some acceptability of the notion of credit for
autonomous liberalisation undertaken by Members since the Uruguay Round. It was
obvious that one way to give credit for such liberalisation would be to treat the rate
prevailing at the end of the Uruguay Round as the base rate for tariff lines that were not
bound.
III.2.6 Implementation periods and staging
As in the past, there was a broad agreement that implementation of the agreed
reduction would be carried out in stages over a number of years. The norm suggested was
the same as in the Uruguay Round, i.e. five years. As in the past, longer implementation
periods could be agreed to in specific cases. One suggestion was that in the case of
sensitive products, a longer period rather than lesser reductions should be allowed.
III.2.7 Non ad valorem tariffs
A number of proposals were made regarding non ad valorem tariffs. While some
countries wanted the elimination of non ad valorem duties, others proposed making some
progress in this regard. US and Canada wanted to maximise the use of ad valorem tariffs
but China proposed that all non ad valorem tariffs must be converted into ad valorem
tariffs.
III.2.8 Special and differential (S&D) treatment of developing countries
There are two types of suggestions for according S&D treatment to developing
countries. A few developed  country Members suggested that particularly substantial
reduction should be made on products of interest to developing countries. The  EC
proposed that Members must agree on deeper cuts on textiles, clothing, and footwear.25
However, a large number of Members put forward proposals on allowing developing
countries to take a lower level of commitments to reduce tariffs. Put another way, the
idea is that developing countries should be allowed to show less than full reciprocity in
tariff negotiations. But the idea was not to give the same treatment to all developing
countries. The least-developed countries were singled out for the most favourable
treatment, but the general sentiment among developed country Members was to tailor the
S&D treatment to other developing countries to their specific level of development.
Thus, Norway spoke of the use by developing countries of differentiated
coefficients. Switzerland proposed that the formula approach must be modulated to take
into account different levels of development. Canada spoke of the formula-based
approaches being sensitive to the varying circumstances of Members. In proposing
elimination of tariff in two stages, the US states that once Members had secured
agreement on the modalities, they should turn to more precise and customised approaches
to ensure participation by developing countries consistent with their individual
development needs.
Hong Kong (China) proposed that the formula should allow a different level of
tariff cut for developing country Members. MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay) stated that deeper reduction commitments were required from
developed countries than developing countries. India proposed that a higher percentage
reduction must be set for developed countries than for developing countries. There were
other proposals also in the same vein. India also proposed flexibility on the level of
binding of individual tariff lines, while maintaining the percentage reduction on an
average basis. It suggested that developing countries must be allowed to bind hitherto
unbound tariff lines “at levels generally above the higher of the bound rates prevailing for
bound items in a country’s tariff schedule”. It suggested further that developing countries
should have the flexibility not to bind unbound tariff lines considered to be highly
sensitive. Other aspects of the Indian proposal have already been explained in the sections
on formula approach and coverage of bindings.26
There seemed to be a general agreement for a longer period being allowed for
developing countries to implement the agreed reductions. Korea and India proposed
seven and ten years respectively.
III.3  Chairman’s draft and subsequent developments
III.3.1 Chairman’s draft elements
As mentioned earlier the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural
Market Access submitted a draft of the elements of modalities for the negotiations in the
area in order to facilitate the negotiating process. We analyze here the revised version of
the draft that the Chairman circulated in August 2003 (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1).
(a)  The ‘core modality’
The Chairman has proposed the use of multiple modalities to achieve the
objectives spelt out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the reduction of non-
agricultural tariffs in the negotiations. However, the central technique (the core modality)
would be the application of the following harmonization formula on a line by line basis:
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t1 is the final rate, to be bound in ad valorem terms
t0 is the base rate
ta is the average of the base rates
B is a coefficient with a unique value to be determined by the participants
The proposal envisaged that participants with a binding coverage of less than 35
per cent would be exempted from the need to apply the formula, but that they would be
required to bind 100 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that did27
not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after the full
implementation of the current concessions.
The proposed formula is clearly a non-linear formula based on the Swiss proposal
adopted in the Tokyo Round. Instead of the common coefficient of 14 or 16 adopted in
the Tokyo Round, this time the proposal is that the tariff average of each participant
would be the coefficient for that participant. The Chairman has proposed one more
coefficient, ‘B’, to be determined by the participants through negotiations. Obviously the
Chairman’s intention was to allow room for negotiations among the participants. The
value of ‘B’ would determine the weightage to be given to the tariff average in the
formula.
An important aspect of the Chairman’s proposed formula was the suggestion on
the base rate. It was designed to give credit for autonomous liberalization, both where the
tariffs had been bound and where they had been reduced but not bound. Where tariff
commitments have been made in the course of previous multilateral negotiations or
plurilateral initiatives the bound rate after the full implementation of the concessions
would be the base rate. Where the bound duties have been further reduced autonomously
after the Uruguay Round, the base rate would be the higher rate that existed before the
reduction. In the case of items that were not previously bound, two times the MFN
applied rate or the new bound rate, whichever is higher, for the year the  liberalization
took place would be the basis.  For unbound items the basis for commencing the tariff
reductions was proposed as two times the MFN applied rate in 2001. Where the MFN
applied rate is less than 2.5 per cent, 5 per cent is to be used as the basis.
Non ad valorem duties have to be converted to ad valorem equivalents according
to procedures that have been prescribed. The negotiations are to commence on the basis
of Harmonized System (HS) 1996 nomenclature but they must be finalized on the basis
of HS2002.28
(b)  Sectorial Tariff Elimination
An element of the Chairman’s proposal is the elimination of tariffs in seven
sectors covering products of interest to the developing countries viz., Electronic &
Electrical Goods; Fish & Fish Products; Footwear; Leather Goods; Motor Vehicle parts
& components; Stones, Gems, & Precious Metals; and Textiles & Clothing.
A feature of the proposal is that both developed and developing participants
would be required to eliminate tariffs. The developed participants would be required to
phase out the tariffs in one phase, while the developing would have the possibility to
implement the elimination in three phases. The developing participants would be required
to bring down the duties to not more than 10 per cent at the end of the first phase,
maintain them at that level during the second phase, and achieve elimination at the end of
the third phase.
The mandatory nature of the proposed sectorial elimination of tariffs differs from
the approach adopted in the zero-for-zero initiatives in the Uruguay Round and in the
Information Technology Agreement. It would be recalled that in the latter the agreements
were operationalised after participants with a major proportion of share of world trade
joined in. In the current proposal the idea is that all must join in.
(c)  Special and Differential Treatment
The use of the tariff average of the participant as one of the coefficients for the
application of the Swiss formula would already  endogenise S&D treatment to some
extent in the proposal for general application. In addition the developing countries are
proposed to be given a longer period of implementation as well as the flexibility to retain
unbound up to 5 per cent of the tariff lines or not to apply the formula cut on them. There
is, however, the condition that no more than 1 per cent of the tariff lines accounting for
no more than1 per cent of the Member’s imports would be so excluded from one HS
Chapter.29
The least-developed country participants  are proposed to be absolved from
undertaking reduction commitments. The expectation from them is only that they would
substantially increase the level of binding commitments.
(d) Newly Acceded Members
In order to account for the fact that the newly acceded Members have undertaken
extensive market access commitments in the course of their accession the Chairman has
proposed that participants consider providing such Members with flexibility by way of a
higher coefficient, a longer implementation period or a grace period which would
commence after the implementation of the current commitments.
(e) Supplementary Modalities
The Chairman has suggested that the participants consider additional
liberalization by employing such modalities as zero-for-zero sector elimination, sectorial
harmonization, and request-offer procedures.
Joint Canada-EC-US Paper
After the circulation of the Chairman’s draft a joint paper was presented
informally by Canada, the EC and the US making certain proposals on the modalities for
the tariff negotiations. A feature of this proposal was the lack of specificity in some of the
elements. The Chairman had proposed a particular harmonising formula while the
Canada-EC-US proposal referred to a non-linear formula. The Chairman had proposed to
take the tariff average as the coefficient, although he had introduced some room for
manoeuvre by introducing the factor ‘B’. The Canada-EC-US paper mentioned a single
coefficient (without specifying it) and referred to the vague concept of trade,
competitiveness, and finance needs of individual developing countries on the basis of
which it would be increased for developing countries. The Chairman had suggested
concrete ways for giving credit for autonomous liberalisation. The Canada-EC-US paper30
mentioned only that such credit would be given without spelling out the manner in which
this would be done. The Chairman specified that for unbound items, the basis for
commencing the reductions would be two times the MFN applied rate. On the other hand,
the Canada-EC-US paper stated that the base rate for unbound tariff lines must be ‘n’
times the applied rates existing on 14 November 2001. Clearly these major players were
not ready for a decision on modalities on the eve of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting at
Cancun.
The Derbez Text
The Draft Cancun Ministerial Text prepared by the Chairman of the General
Council (JOB (03)/150/Rev.1) contained the proposed framework for establishing
modalities in agriculture as well as in market access for non-agricultural products. Annex
B of the Ministerial Text underwent some minor modification in the eventual draft that
was presented to the Ministers at Cancun by the Chairman of the conference, Foreign
Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez of Mexico (JOB (03)/150/Rev.2). In the level of specificity
the proposed framework resembled more the joint Canada-EC-US text than the draft
circulated by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market Access for  Non-
Agricultural Products. Some of the elements proposed by the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group were taken on board but all numbers, where mentioned, were placed
under square brackets, denoting the Chairman’s lack of confidence that Members would
eventually agree to specific suggestion. The following were some of the important
elements of the framework for tariff negotiations proposed in the Derbez Text:
•  the Negotiating Group would continue its work on a non-linear formula applied on a
line by line basis
•  For unbound tariff lines the basis for commencing the tariff reductions shall be [two]
times the MFN applied rate in the base year
•  credit  shall be given for autonomous liberalisation by the developing countries
provided that the tariff lines were bound in the WTO after the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round31
•  participants with a binding coverage of less than [35] per cent would be exempt from
making reductions according to the formula and would be required only to bind [100]
per  cent of tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed the overall average of
bound levels of all developing countries
•  sectorial elimination or harmonisation particularly in respect of products of interest to
developing countries with the participation of all countries but with adequate
flexibility for developing countries was recognised as an important element for
achieving the objectives set out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration
•  flexibility for developing countries for applying less than formula cut in respect of
[10] per cent of the tariff lines or keeping [5] per cent of the lines unbound as well as
longer implementation period were some of the measures envisaged for special and
differential treatment of developing countries.
The discussions immediately before and during the Cancun meeting centred on
whether a non-linear or linear formula would be the core modality and whether the
sectorial elimination proposals would be mandatory or non-mandatory. The assessment
of many participants was that agreement on a framework was possible at Cancun but the
Ministerial Meeting ended in discord over deeper differences over agriculture and the
Singapore issues.
We have reviewed the main proposals made by Members and the attempts at
finding the meeting ground on various elements of the modalities. In future negotiations
the proposed elements would be further discussed and new ideas may emerge on the key
aspects. Before making recommendations on the modalities that would be in the best
interest of India in the negotiations we take up some broader considerations that should
be taken into account in developing an approach towards the negotiations.
IV  Approaching WTO Negotiations on Tariffs
India had pronounced itself against holding negotiations on non-agricultural
tariffs at the outset and the stance was maintained until mid-2001. It was only during the32
Doha Ministerial meeting that it finally joined the consensus in its favour. In the WTO
discussions on modalities, India initially showed itself to be a reluctant participant in the
negotiations in the area. It was only in its submission dated 18 March 2003 that India
made a proposal that carried a message that it was willing and ready to engage in the
negotiations on market access in non-agricultural products. By the time of the Fifth
Ministerial Conference India’s position had evolved considerably and at Cancun it was
supporting the elements of modalities proposed by the Chairman of the Negotiating
Group with the exception of  sectorial tariff elimination on a mandatory basis.  The
domestic tariff policy reforms undertaken in the country since 1991–92, the
recommendations of successive expert panels set up by the Government of India, and the
imperatives of international trade policy developments, all point towards the need for the
country to continue a positive approach and in fact adopt a proactive role in these
negotiations. We take up each of these aspects in turn.
IV.1  Evolution of India’s Tariffs and Trade Policy since 1991–92
Prior to the 1991–92 economic reforms, India maintained very high  import
barriers. Virtually no product could be imported freely. Even where imports were allowed
without license, some conditions applied, such as restriction on who could import and for
what purpose. Consumer goods were generally banned for imports. In addition to
quantitative restrictions on imports, India maintained very high import tariffs going up to
300 per cent ad valorem although over-valued exchange rates alleviated these restrictions
to some extent. If the Government decided to bring down these barriers it was because of
the realisation that the Indian industry could not become efficient without sharply scaling
down these barriers. India needed to integrate itself into the world economy in order to
become competitive. Impressive progress has been made in this regard since then. The
exchange rate system was first changed and a market-determined unified exchange rate
established. Import controls were virtually withdrawn in 1991–92 on all raw materials,
intermediates, and capital goods. It took a longer time to abolish such controls on
consumer goods but that too was finally accomplished in 2001. The process of reduction
of peak tariffs was also begun in right earnest and these were progressively brought down
every year up to 1997–98. There was an interruption in this process of reduction during33
the next two or three years, and in fact new duties were imposed by way of a 4 per cent
Special Additional Duty (SAD) in 1998–99 and a 10 per cent surcharge on basic customs
duty in 1999–2000. After this interlude, the policy of reduction of external trade barriers
adopted as an integral part of the economic reforms in 1991–92 has reasserted itself. The
surcharge on basic customs duty was given up in 2001–02, and the peak basic customs
duty reduced to 30 per cent in 2002–03, 25 per cent in 2003–04, and 20 per cent in the
interim budget for 2004-05. The SAD was also abolished in the interim budget.
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As stated earlier, India increased the proportion of its tariff bindings considerably
(from 3 to more than 60 per cent) during the Uruguay Round in respect of non-
agricultural products. At that time, the bindings left out mainly the consumer goods,
including consumer durable goods. Shortly after the establishment of the WTO, India
undertook some additional tariff commitments in textile and clothing items and at the
time the Doha Round began, bindings covered 69 per cent of the tariff lines. Seventy per
cent of the bound tariff lines are bound at the level of 40 per cent ad valorem and 17 per
cent at 25 per cent ad valorem. The remaining 13 per cent are bound at various levels,
including zero for information technology products. Most of India’s bound tariff lines are
in the range of 20–40 per cent. There are only a few tariff lines that are outside the higher
end of this range. A number of tariff lines pertaining to textiles and clothing products
have mixed tariffs, but the ad  valorem element is in the range of 25–40 per cent.
                                                                
7  The Government of India had maintained that SAD was an internal tax. Section 3A of the Customs
Tariff Act, 1975 provided as follows:
“3(A)(1) Any article which is imported into India shall in addition be liable to a duty (hereinafter
referred to in this section as the special additional duty), which shall be levied at a rate to be specified
by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, having regard to the maximum sales
tax, local tax or any other charges for the time being leviable on a like article on its sale or purchase in
India;
Provided that until such rate is specified by the Central Government, the special additional duty shall be
levied and collected at the rate of eight per cent, of the value of the article imported into India.”
This provision makes it clear that no attempt was made to relate the level of the duty to the
existing level of internal taxes and the rate of 8 per cent, which was later reduced to 4 per cent, was
fixed purely on an ad hoc basis.
Although SAD was leviable at the comparatively low level of 4 per cent, the valuation of imported
consignments for the purposes of imposition of SAD increases the incidence of duty. As a result of the
application of the valuation provision in paragraph 2 of Section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, a
duty of 4 per cent translated itself into a figure of 5 per cent if the customs duty was 25 per cent.34
Reduction of peak tariffs to the level of 20 per cent has already created a substantial
wedge between the applied and bound tariff lines.
IV.2  Agenda for Tariff Reform in India
That the Indian Government’s intention is to continue the process of tariff
reduction has been confirmed by all its recent Finance Ministers in their budget speeches.
They have reiterated that the Government’s intention was to reduce tariffs to the levels
prevailing in the ASEAN countries. More recently, the Finance Minister has spoken in
terms of the tariff levels being brought down to the levels of 20, 10, and 5 per cent. It is
clear that the intention of the Government is to bring down tariff levels substantially in
the not too distant future so that the customs duty protection does not exceed the levels
prevailing in other industrialising as well as industrialised countries. Indeed, substantial
reduction of these levels has been the thrust of the recommendations of successive panels
established by the Government, even though they have differed on the structure of future
tariffs.
The Inter-ministerial group on Customs Tariff Reform, whose report was
submitted by Dr. Arvind Virmani to the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) in
November 2001, supported the Government’s intention to lower the so-called ‘peak rate’
to 20 per cent by 2004–5. (MoF, Revenue Department 2001) It also proposed further
reduction in this rate to 10 per cent thereafter.  In an April 2002 Planning Commission
working paper, (Virmani 2002) Dr. Virmani proposed adoption of a single uniform rate
of import duty of 10 per cent by the year 2006–07 for all categories of goods and defined
a phased programme of tariff reductions over the decade.  He argued that a single rate of
nominal duty would be equitable, as it would protect to an equal extent all producers and
all uses of capital and labour. It would be neutral, would promote efficiency and
competitiveness, and eliminate all administrative hassles and legal disputes about
classification.35
In December 2002, the Kelkar Panel (Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs
2002) made the following recommendation for changes in the customs duty regime on
imports:
§  For life-saving drugs and equipment, sovereign imports, and imports by RBI—0
per cent;
§  For other goods:
(a)  By 2004–05:  Raw materials, inputs and intermediate goods—10%,
Consumer durable goods—20%;




As stated earlier, what the Virmani and Kelkar reports had in common was the
recommendation for a drastic reduction of import tariffs in a relatively short time frame.
It is apparent that in India there is a remarkable convergence of views in expert circles
and in the political leadership that the levels of import duties must be brought down
substantially over a comparatively short time frame.
IV.3  India’s Tariffs in Comparison with Other Countries
As the Government of India would like to bring down its tariffs to the levels
prevailing in ASEAN and other industrialising countries it is instructive to compare the
prevailing levels of tariffs in these countries. Calculations made in the Planning
Commission for the year 2001–02 gave the following results for the weighted-average
import duties in percentage ad valorem terms:36
Table 3: Weighted-average import duty







For China, the weighted-average import duty was 18.5 per cent in 2001–02 but it
is scheduled to go down to 10 per cent when the commitments made in the process of
accession to the WTO are implemented.
Table 4, drawn from a recent document brought out by the WTO Secretariat,
gives the picture of India’s applied MFN tariffs in comparison to a group of developing
and developed countries:
Table 4: MFN Statutory Applied Duties for non-agricultural products
Country Year Simple average Peaks (>15 %)
Argentina 2001 12.71 36.2
Brazil 2001 14.9 50
China 1997 16.3 42.4
India 1997 35.0 92.8
Indonesia 1999 8.4 13.3
Korea 2001 7.5 1.6
Malaysia 2001 8.1 23.3
Philippines 2001 6.8 9.7
Thailand 1999 15.5 31.2
Canada 2001 4.3 9.3
EC 2001 4.3 0.8
Japan 2001 2.7 0.7
US 2001 3.6 3.2
Source:  WTO Document TN/MA/S/4/Rev.1.
It would be seen that the simple average of applied duties in India was more than
double of the level of other developing countries in the list, like China, that have high
tariffs, and 8–13 times that of the major developed countries. In 92.8 per cent of the tariff
lines, Indian tariffs were more than 15 per cent, a figure that was far higher than that of
other developing countries. The reduction of peak tariff to 20 per cent and the abolition of37
the SAD in the interim budget of 2004-05 has considerably improved the relative position
of India but it is still a long way to go before India’s tariff profile becomes comparable
with that of its principal trading partners. In as many as 81.04 per cent of the non-
agricultural tariff lines the basic customs duty is at the peak level of 20 per cent and in
6.33 per cent it is more and sometimes much more than 20 per cent. In 115 six-digit tariff
lines in Chapter 3 and Headings 16.04-05 (fish and fish products) the basic customs duty
is 30 per cent; in Chapter 72 (iron and steel) it is 20 per cent and in Headings 87.03 and
87.11 it is 60 per cent. The simple tariff average in respect of non-agricultural tariff lines
is still 20.52 per cent. While liberalisation in India since 1991–92, particularly in respect
of non-agricultural products, has been unprecedented, the current level and structure of
tariffs in the country does not as yet measure up to international standards. For promoting
an internationally competitive economy, it is imperative for India to complete the agenda
of reform in the area of tariff, and do so quickly. There was no reason for India to have
been defensive in these negotiations.
Table 5 gives the picture of India’s bound tariffs in comparison with some other
developed and developing country Members:
Table 5: Bound duties on non-agricultural products











Argentina 100 35 31.8 0 98.1 0
Brazil 100 85 30.8 0.3 97.1 0
China 100 50 9.1 6.2 13.3 1.3
India 69.8 150 34.3 2.5 60.1 0.1
Indonesia 96 60 35.6 2.2 89.7 0
Korea 93.6 80 10.2 15.1 11.9 3.6
Malaysia 81.2 40 14.9 4.1 38.5 0
Philippines 61.8 50 23.4 2.2 50.2 0
Thailand 70.9 80 24.2 2.5 47.2 0.3
Canada 99.6 20 5.3 29.4 6.8 6.4
EC 100 26 3.9 23.9 0.8 7.1
Japan 99.5 30 2.3 57.1 0.6 10.3
US 100 48 3.2 38.5 1.8 8.2
*  This column gives the percentage of tariff lines in which the level of tariffs is at least three times higher
than the Member’s overall simple average. The WTO document cited above has designated these tariff
lines as “national peaks” and the lines above 15 per cent as “international peaks”.
Source: WTO Document TN/MA/S/4/Rev.1/Corr.138
The simple averages of bound tariffs of developed countries are in the range of 2–
5 per cent while those of the selected developing countries in Table 5 are in the range of
9–35 per cent. It is interesting to observe that the simple averages of China and Korea are
nearer the range of the developed countries than those of other developing countries
while India’s average is at the higher end of the range. Analysis of tariff peaks (>15 per
cent) also reveals a similar position. The percentage of tariff lines in the developed
countries above this level is in the range of 0.6 to 6.8, while in the developing countries it
is between 11.9 and 98.1. Once again, China and Korea are nearer the developed
countries than to other developing countries. As far as national peaks are concerned, the
developed countries show a much higher percentage than the developing countries. The
duty free percentages of developing countries are quite low while those of the developed
countries are in the range of 24–57 per cent. India shares with some of the ASEAN
countries the feature of not binding a substantial proportion of its non-agricultural tariffs.
The percentage of India’s international peaks (>15 per cent) seems to be
somewhat less than those of some other developing countries. It must be noted that the
figures in the ‘peaks’ column give the percentage of tariff lines with the total number of
bound tariff lines as denominator. In India’s case, the percentage is about 60 because
India has bound only about 70 per cent of its tariff lines. If it had bound all or most of its
tariff lines the percentage of tariff lines bound at a rate greater than 15 per cent would
have in all likelihood been substantially higher. As for national peaks, the WTO
document shows that in India, 0.1 per cent of the tariff lines are covered, that is four six-
digit tariff lines. In actual fact, India’s tariff schedule has seven non-agricultural products
(all chemical items) bound at 150 per cent. These products are not sensitive items and the
high level of binding was probably the result of a misconception that these items were
agricultural products.
IV.4  Regionalism and India
Over the past 10 years or so, a wave of regionalism has been sweeping the world
and regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have been proliferating. New arrangements39
have come into existence, old ones have been deepened and broadened, and several more
are in the pipeline. Out of the 250 RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO, as many as 162
were in existence on 1 January 2002 (WT/REG/W/44). There is intense activity in the
process of formation of integration arrangements and the latest WTO Annual Report
estimates that by the end of 2005, the number of RTAs could be in the range of 300
(WT/TPR/OV/8). The existing RTAs already cover more than half the world trade. RTAs
have been motivated by a number of economic and political factors. Geographical
proximity, cultural similarity, and similar levels of development continue to be important
factors though they are not the only determinants.
The European Union, which is the oldest and biggest RTA, has recently grown
from 15 to 25 members, and  is likely to become a part of the Euro-Mediterranean Free
Trade Area by 2010. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into
being in 1995 and in December 2003 - January 2004 the US concluded the Central
American Free Trade Area (CAFTA), with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Differences between the US on the one hand and the Mercosur
countries on the other seem to have stalled the conclusion of negotiations for the time
being but it is not unlikely that over time a free trade area encompassing North and South
America comes into existence, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In the
Asian region, Japan has dropped its earlier reservation against joining a Free Trade Area
initiative and is now actively seeking the conclusion of bilateral FTAs with other
important economies in the region, except with India. A few years ago India made a start
with FTAs in the South Asian region (Sri Lanka and South Asian Free Trade Area) and in
2003 it concluded separate framework agreements for FTAs with ASEAN and Thailand.
In 2004 India also became a Party to the BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka and Thailand Economic Co-operation) Agreement. A dialogue for the formation of
free trade areas has also been commenced with Singapore and the MERCOSUR. What is
significant, however, is that India has not received an invitation to be linked with any of
the major industrialised economies with RTAs.  In the above background the future of
India’s trade is clouded by the prospects of being discriminated against in all the three
major markets—the US, the EC, and Japan. India will be placed at a competitive40
disadvantage in these markets  vis-à-vis the constituent members of the RTAs. A
comparative analysis of exports to the US from Mexico and India after the establishment
of the NAFTA carried out in an ICRIER study (Aggarwal 2004) brings out the serious
trade diversion effect of FTAs. Comparing the figures of Mexico’s exports to the US
during the triennium 1989-91 with those in the triennium 1997-99 it is seen that there was
a phenomenal increase in certain product groups. Exports of made-ups increased about 27
times, of apparel about 70 times, leather manufactures by about 14 times and footwear by
about 8 times. During this period India’s share of the US market went up from 1.6 to 2.8
per cent for made-ups while that of Mexico increased from 1.6 to 13.8 per cent. In
apparel India increased its share from 2.8 to 3.3 while Mexico’s went up from 0.3 to 12.6
percent. In leather manufactures India’s share increased from 1.5 to 2.3 while that of
Mexico from 0.7 to 5.6 per cent. In footwear India’s share declined from 0.9 to 0.8 per
cent while that of Mexico went up from 0.7 to 3.3 per cent. These are the product groups
in which India has export interest and at the same time the MFN rates are relatively high
and no concession is granted to developing countries under the Generalised System of
Preferences. To some extent the difference is also accounted for by the fact that textile
and apparel items have quantitative restrictions applied to them under the WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which would be phased out at the end of 2004.
  What should be India’s strategy in this situation? Free Trade Areas linking India
with one or more of its industrialised country trading partners are likely to be
problematic. A simpler course that India could adopt is to try to minimise the trade
diversion potential of these major RTAs by securing a reduction in the non-
discriminatory (MFN) tariffs worldwide. This can be accomplished only by joining forces
with those WTO Members that are pushing for ambitious results in the area of non-
agricultural (and agricultural) market access in the Doha Round. These negotiations are
aimed at reducing inter alia the MFN  tariffs of WTO Members. The way to meet the
challenge of being left out of major RTAs is to strive for very substantial results in the
Negotiating Group on Market Access in Non-Agricultural Products.
The foregoing analysis in this section brings up the following points:41
§  India has embarked on a process of reform to bring its tariffs down to international
levels in order to promote efficiency in an integrating world economy. While
impressive progress in trade liberalisation has been made in the last 12 years or so, its
tariff levels remain very high by international standards.
§  There is convergence of views among experts that the tariff levels on non-agricultural
products must be brought down drastically over a comparatively short time frame,
and the political leadership shares this view.
§  India had bound only about 70 per cent of its non-agricultural tariff lines before the
Doha Round. This gives it considerable bargaining leverage in the current
negotiations. Reduction in peak levels of applied tariffs during the past few years has
already brought down the level of duty below the rates at which many of them were
bound. This further enhances India’s bargaining ability.
India’s trade interest is already suffering because of the creation of a number of
regional trading arrangements, and it is likely to suffer even more on account of the
formation of new RTAs and strengthening and expansion of existing ones. While
entering into FTAs with some of its trading partners in Asia will be some consolation, its
being linked with FTAs with the major industrialised countries is not likely in the
foreseeable future. In the situation, the best bet for India to alleviate the situation created
by tariff discrimination arising from RTAs is to ensure that the adopted modality results
in the steepest reduction of tariffs in India’s trading partners.
V  Proposed Indian Stand on Modalities in Tariff Negotiations
It would be evident from the conclusions drawn at the end of Part IV that there is
every reason for India to eschew the defensive posture that it had initially struck in
respect of market access for non-agricultural products. Given the serious harm that is
being done to India’s trade interests by the existing RTAs and the further harm that might
be done in the future by the expansion of these RTAs and the establishment of new
RTAs, India must be proactive in these negotiations. Ambitious results in these
negotiations will bring down the MFN tariffs worldwide and minimise the harmful trade-42
diversion effects of preferences within RTAs. Since India is firmly set on the course of
steep reduction of industrial tariffs, it would only have to undertake commitments to bind
its tariffs at levels to which these are reduced for entirely autonomous reasons (to achieve
economic efficiency). Binding the tariffs at reduced levels is not necessary from the point
of view of domestic policy, although some countries rely on WTO commitments to ward
off protectionist pressures to raise tariffs. India needs to bind tariffs only in return for
substantial concessions from its tariff partners. India must exploit fully the bargaining
potential of the concessions that it can make in this area. These concessions could be in
the area of tariffs or in other areas in which it has an interest, such as movement of
natural persons in the negotiations on services, and reduction of subsidies in the
negotiations on agriculture. After all, in terms of the Doha mandate, the negotiating
agenda represents a single undertaking.  While the overall approach must be positive,
India must lose no opportunity to strengthen its bargaining ability in the negotiations.
This will enable India to secure even greater concessions than it would be able to get
ordinarily.
With the above considerations in view we propose below the stand to be taken by
India on the modalities of negotiations:
V.1  Principle modality: A formula approach
The decision on modalities would involve a choice among alternative approaches,
viz. a formula approach (linear or harmonisation formula), request- offer  (product-by-
product) procedures or sectorial elimination or harmonisation (mandatory or voluntary).
It has become apparent during the discussions that no single modality can respond to the
interests and concerns of all Members.  The question is not of excluding one modality or
the other, but of deciding which one should be the core modality.
If India were to continue its past negative stance, then obviously it would have
been appropriate for it to favour the product-by-product technique. The adoption of such
a technique would have enabled India and other countries to exercise total control on the
new concessions that they have to grant. The results would have been minimal, as the43
reductions would have taken place in each Member only on those tariff lines that were
considered by it as non-sensitive. But we have adduced reasons in the earlier analysis for
India to be ambitious in its outlook and proactive in its approach. The best way to
promote far-reaching results is to go in for the formula approach. But among the
proposed formulae, which one is the best in India’s interest? Table 6 shows the results of
the application of the various formulae proposed by Members to various ranges of tariff.
For the formulae in which the average national tariff is a factor (as in the formulae of
China and Korea), we have made the calculations with the average tariff at 34.3 per cent,
which is the simple average of India’s bound tariffs, and at 5 per cent, which is the rough
order of magnitude of the average level of tariffs in the US, EC, and Japan. China has
proposed different values for the adjusting coefficient “B” for the years 2010 and 2015.
For the sake of comparability particularly with the US, which has also made separate
proposals for 2010 and 2015, we have adopted the value of the adjusting coefficient “B”
proposed for 2010.  India has proposed a two-step reduction, but here we have taken into44
Table 6: Results of the application of the proposed formulae on various tariff ranges















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
5 0 3.63 4.42 4 4 2.96 3.4 2.5
10 4.44 5.79 7.92 8 8 5.23 6.7 5
15 5.22 7.24 10.79 8.5 12 7.5 10.1 7.5
20 5.71 8.29 13.19 9 16 8.57 13.4 10
25 6.06 9.09 15.24 9.5 20 9.64 16.8 12.5
30 6.31 9.72 17.02 10 20.5 10.71 20.1 15
35 6.51 10.22 18.59 10.5 21 11.78 23.5 17.5
40 6.67 10.64 19.98 11 21.5 12.86 26.8 20
Columns (2)–(9) above show the final rates resulting from the application of various proposed formulae to the initial rates given in column (1).
An interesting aspect that comes out in the above table is that the Chinese and Korean formulae would have differential impact on the developed
and developing countries. Columns (3) and (5) give the final rates in the cases in which the simple national average of tariffs is 5 per cent.
Application of the Chinese formula for a tariff average of 5 per cent would reduce the initial 40 per cent level to 10.6 per cent while the
application of the Korean formula for the same tariff average of 5 per cent would bring down 40 per cent to 11 per cent.   45
consideration only the first step. The tariff range considered by us is 0–40 per cent, which
takes care of the full or almost full range of bound tariffs on non-agricultural products in
India and its developed country trading partners.
In deciding on the adoption of formulae, the first question that arises relates to
whether India should propose the adoption of different formulae for developing and
developed countries. In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, developing countries were
exempted from the application of linear or formula approaches and they were also
exempted from the target of one-third reduction, set in the Uruguay Round. It is felt that
if India presses for the continuation of the same approach, ambitious results cannot be
obtained from the developed countries. A viable alternative would be to suggest that
developing countries would also subscribe to an appropriate formula, but a more rigorous
formula needs to be adopted by the developed countries. In fact, India has already made
such a proposal, although the differentiation between developed and developing countries
has not been done through a different formula but by applying a different factor in the
same formula.  Against the background of minimal contributions by the developing
countries in past tariff negotiations, pressing for the acceptance of a differential formula
for developing countries, or at least a different coefficient for them in a harmonisation
formula, would seem to be a reasonable approach for India to adopt during the
negotiations.  As an alternative the formula could be so designed as to have a differential
impact on the developing and developed countries, as has been proposed in the Chinese
and Korean formulae.  India had proposed that to achieve harmonisation a cut must be
applied in the second step so that no individual tariff was more than three times the
national average of the final level of tariffs. The Indian proposal was quite appropriate
from the tariff compression perspective and not bad as an instrument to secure reduction
of peak tariffs in the developed countries. Table 7 gives the result of the application of
the formulae proposed by India and others on the maximum levels of tariff in the US, EC,
and Japan. Where the average level of base rate tariffs is a factor, we have used the
calculations of these averages made by the WTO Secretariat (TN/MA/S/4/Rev.1/Corr.1).
For the application of the Indian formula, we have assumed that a 50 per cent linear cut
would be applied to tariffs in these countries as the first step.46
Table 7: Results of the application of the proposed formulae on maximum tariff
Countries Initial
Level





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
US 48 0 6.86 3.16 8.37 9.28 14.57 4.8
EC 26 0 6.12 3.69 8.36 8.06 9.86 5.85
Japan 30 0 6.31 2.27 6.14 6.22 10.71 3.45
The best results in securing reduction in the peak rates in the developed countries
would undoubtedly be achieved by applying the US suggestion for elimination of all
tariffs by 2015. Table 7 shows that the application of the Chinese formula for 2015 (B=1)
gives the next best results.
It is not easy to rank the formulae proposed by Members from India’s perspective.
One formula might be better from the perspective of seeking maximum reduction in the
tariffs of its trading partners and another from the point of view of the commitments that
it would have to make. Taking both the perspectives into account, the Chinese formula
(B=3) and the Korean formula appear to be equally good from the point of view of India.
They secure a drastic reduction in the tariffs of the major developed countries while such
reduction would be considerably less for India.
However, even more advantageous from India’s perspective is the formula
suggested by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group. Chairman’s formula uses as its
central element the Swiss formula, the merit of which is well recognised for bringing
about harmonisation of tariff. What makes the formula attractive for high tariff countries
like India is that the tariff average is used as the coefficient. Since a property of the Swiss
formula is that the coefficient becomes the ceiling level of the new tariffs resulting from
its application, the implication is that for a country like India with higher average tariffs
the impact would be less severe than for countries with a low average tariff. Thus an
element of special and differential treatment gets built into the formula and it becomes47
less important for India to be seeking more explicit ways of according special and
differential treatment. It follows that in the Chairman’s formula the factor “B” should be
taken as equal to unity. Taking lower figures of 0.75 or 0.5 would not make sense, as the
tariff average needs to be given full weight in the formula and there is no compelling
ground for reducing it arbitrarily. Another attractive feature of the Chairman’s proposal is
that it recommends that with respect to unbound tariff lines the base rate would be two
times the applied level in 2001, the year in which the negotiations were launched. Since
India has not bound 30 per cent of its non-agricultural tariff lines, it would benefit
considerably from this provision on the base rate. With the suggested uplift for unbound
tariffs the average tariff for India rises to 44.5 per cent from the simple average of 34.3
for the bound tariffs. Use of the Chairman’s formula (with the value of the factor “B”
being taken as equal to unity) would bring down India’s tariffs bound in the Uruguay
Round from the level of 40% to about 21% and the unbound levels from the general peak
of 35% (in 2001) to about 27%. For a few unbound products for which the applied rate
was higher than general peak of 35 %, the bound rate after the application of the
Chairman's formula would be higher. These bound rates are higher than those prevailing
in India at the beginning of 2004, except in the case of fish and fish products and
automotive products. At the same time this formula would result in the maximum levels
of tariff in the US and EC being brought down to a little above 3% as against the current
levels of 48% and 26% respectively.
Even if the Chairman’s suggestions in their entirety are not accepted at the
negotiations India should advance the following arguments and counter-arguments in
support of giving adequate weight to the tariff average and greater flexibility in respect of
the unbound tariffs in any future formula for tariff harmonisation:
(i)  GATT 1994 (Article XXVIII bis) requires inter alia that negotiations must take
into account the needs of developing countries “for a more flexible use of tariff
protection to assist their economic development and the special needs of these
countries to maintain tariffs for revenue purposes”. While the notion of high
tariffs being needed for assisting economic development is now discredited the48
need to take revenue needs into account while reducing tariffs is still valid. The
Doha Declaration reiterates that negotiations in this area must take fully into
account the special needs of developing country participants. Factoring in the
tariff average would be a good way of fulfilling these  mandates;
(ii)  In terms of economic good sense tariff compression is a desirable objective;
applying a formula that brings down the tariffs in all lines below the average tariff
of the country concerned is an effective way of achieving this objective;
(iii)  The post-Uruguay levels of tariffs and bindings of individual Members represent
the overall balance that was struck among participants in the Uruguay Round
package and have to be the starting point in new negotiations. If in any Member
the levels at which tariffs were bound were high or the proportion of bindings was
low, the concerned Member would be fully justified in seeking that adequate
allowance must be made for the pre-existing contractual balance in the design of
the formula for the reduction of tariff in the current Round.
The joint Canada-EC-US paper speaks of a non-linear harmonising formula with
a single coefficient. It does state that the coefficient would be varied for developing
countries “consistent with their trade, development, competitiveness and finance needs”.
Additionally the coefficient would be further increased “as a result of Members fully
binding their tariffs and participating meaningfully through reductions in their binding
overhang which effectively enhance market access”. There is nothing fundamentally
wrong with the basic approach in this paper. What is wrong is that it takes the
negotiations backwards rather than forward. In the absence of clear quantifiable elements,
the determination the formula and the coefficient(s) in future negotiations would have a
tendency to be a function of the economic clout of Members. The use of tariff average as
a coefficient inspires greater confidence than the vague formulations on the “trade,
development and finance needs” of developing countries.49
There is no reason for India to reject the Canada-EC-US paper. That would be a
confrontational approach. Rather India must endeavour to ensure that that it is elaborated
in such a way that its elements approximate as closely as possible to the Chairman’s
paper.
V.2  Request–Offer approach
Whichever formula is adopted by its developed country (and developing country)
partners, there would always be opportunity for seeking additional concessions from
them through request—offer procedures. However, concessions can be sought under the
request—offer procedure only in respect of tariff lines in which India is the principal
supplier, or one of the two principal suppliers or has a substantial supplier interest.
Generally a country with an import share of 10 per cent or more is considered to have at
least a substantial supplier status. Countries having a share of 30 per cent or more have
the status of a sole or joint principal supplier. Table 8 shows the coverage of the tariff
lines in which India has principal or substantial supplier status in the four major
developed countries.

































Canada 504 1708 104 50 166 99
EC 7934 4235 1031 118 2219 253
Japan 1333 936 114 49 519 15
US 5499 2885 626 124 1004 89
Source: Integrated Database of WTO. The reporting year of the countries being 2001 except for Japan, for
which its 2000.
It would be seen that India has substantial presence in these markets as a supplier
with a share of 30 per cent or more. In the tariff lines where it has such a large share it
can stake a claim as a principal supplier and try to get deeper reduction than what the50
application of the agreed formula can secure. In return, India will have to also grant
additional concessions. In his proposals the Chairman has suggested that request-offer
procedures must be utilised for deeper reduction of tariffs on individual products, where
the reduction delivered by the application of the formula may not be enough. The
opportunity for using this modality would depend on the choice of the formula. If the
Chairman’s formula were to be adopted there would be little need for India to use this
modality in the negotiations with our major industrialised country trading partners. The
application of the formula would already deliver the results for us in these markets.
However, there would be some scope for India to use this procedure as far as the
developing country trading partners are concerned. If the Chairman’s suggestion to allow
developing countries to exempt from binding altogether or not to apply formula cut in
respect of 5 per cent of the tariff lines succeeds, it would open an avenue for India to
trade away the exemption or exception from the application of the formula when
opportunities occur for using request-offer procedures.
V.3   Sector approach
There are two variants of the  sectorial approach: the mandatory approach as
envisaged by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market Access
or the voluntary zero-for-zero or harmonisation approach, as was adopted in the Uruguay
Round and in the Information Technology Agreement. As a part of the overall package
the Chairman has suggested elimination by the developed and developing countries alike
of tariff in seven sectors viz. Electronic & Electrical Goods; Fish and Fish products;
Footwear; Leather goods; Motor Vehicle parts &components; Stones, Gems & Precious
Metals; and Textiles & Clothing. Sectorial tariff elimination is a compulsory element for
the reduction of tariff by all Members except the least developed countries. The
developing countries would have the flexibility to bring down the duties in three phases
while others would have to do so in one phase. This could give to developing countries
15 years time for phasing down the tariff if each phase is of five years duration.
At least five of these sectors are of great export interest to India and in two of
them viz. footwear and textiles and apparel the bound/ applied tariffs are high in India’s51
trading partners, developed and developing alike. In leather goods the tariffs are high in
Japan, Korea and India’s ASEAN trading partners. India is emerging as a major exporter
in motor vehicle components and here the tariffs are high in the ASEAN region. Thus
tariff elimination in these areas would have great attraction for India.
However, we have to take into the account the fact that in India duties, albeit at a
low level, would persist on some basic raw materials and intermediate goods. The Kelkar
panel has recommended 5% for raw materials and 8% for intermediate products. Thus the
basic chemicals for the processing of leather and textiles will attract tariff.
Petrochemicals needed to manufacture man-made fibres would also attract 5% tariffs.
Steel, which is the most important intermediate product for automotive products, will
continue to be protected by a duty of at least 5 to 8%. This would imply that many capital
goods, which are steel intensive, would also need to be protected. In the light of this, if
India joins in the initiative for sectorial elimination, there would be negative protection in
areas like automotive products, leather and textiles. For this reason India cannot be in a
position to accept this element of the Chairman’s proposal in the form in which it was
presented.  India could find the bargain attractive if the developed countries agree to
eliminate tariffs and the others are required to bring it down to the maximum tariffs to
5%.
Harmonisation or elimination initiatives such as those adopted in the Uruguay
Round would of course be different. Here countries join the initiative on a voluntary basis
if they have a substantial share of world trade. Such an initiative could succeed in the
case of environmental goods, an area that has been mentioned in the Canada-EC-US
paper. Whatever the ultimate decision is on the coverage it is unlikely that India would be
found to be having a share in world trade that is significant enough for it to be under
pressure to join the initiative. Another area mentioned in the joint paper is textiles and
apparel. Here it is almost certain that success of the initiative would need India’s
participation. For the reasons given above India should favour tariff harmonisation,
whereby tariffs are brought down to the same levels in all countries. There could be a
common level for all textile and clothing products or different levels for yarn, fabrics and52
clothing. Even better would be the scheme suggested in the mandatory approach of the
preceding paragraph in which the developing countries are given the flexibility to
maintain tariffs at a reasonable level while the developed ones eliminate them.
V.4  Coverage of Bindings
The Ministerial mandate in respect of non-agricultural products requires that
product coverage must be comprehensive and without a priori  exclusions. While the
developed countries and some developing countries have already bound all or nearly all
non-agricultural tariffs, India has bound only about 70 per cent of its six-digit tariff lines
and several ASEAN countries are in the same position. While it would be difficult to
argue for any country to keep a substantial number of tariff lines out altogether, India’s
first position must be that it is willing to take commitments on unbound lines as well but
only on request-offer basis. It would be rational for India to demand that unbound tariff
lines must be kept out of the purview of the application of the agreed formula.  The
balance of commitments at the end of the Uruguay Round was established with India not
having taken tariff commitments in respect of 30 per cent of its non-agricultural tariff
lines. If now India is expected to extend the coverage of its bindings, its trading partners
must be willing to pay for it by means of additional concessions on products of interest to
India.
If unbound tariffs are to be subjected to reduction by the application of a formula
two aspects have to be taken into account. First these tariff lines are not part of the pre-
existing contractual balance among the WTO Members, as no commitments were taken
on them earlier. Second credit needs to be given to the Members concerned for the
autonomous liberalisation that has been made by Members since the Uruguay Round. In
India’s case the ‘peak rate’ of tariff on non-agricultural tariffs has been brought down
from 65 per cent prevailing in 1994-95 to 35 per cent in 2001-2002.  If the applied level
prevalent at the time the current negotiations were launched is taken as the base rate, it
would be manifestly unjust for those Members that have been going beyond their existing
commitments in reducing tariffs after the Uruguay Round.  In order to give them credit
for such liberalisation the minimum that could be done must be to take as the base rate53
the rate applicable at the time the Uruguay Round concluded (April 1994). In fact it could
be argued that the Uruguay Round concluded on 15 December 1993, when the Chairman
of the Trade Negotiations Committee declared that the negotiations were over. Locking
in the current level of liberalisation is a good  idea for imparting predictability and
stability to the trading system, but in the process the system should not take away the
right of the concerned Members to be compensated for the concessions. In suggesting
that for unbound tariffs the base rate must be two times the applied rate in 2001, the
Chairman has made a pragmatic suggestion that takes fully into account the
considerations spelt out above.
India’s suggestion to permit developing countries to exclude a proportion of tariff
lines from the purview of reduction commitments in the Doha Round is also relevant for
consideration of the question of coverage. As we noted above, the thrust of tariff
liberalisation in India seems to have bypassed three groups of products (fish and fish
products, iron and steel and motor vehicles), in which the levels are in excess of the
ceiling of 20 per cent. Should India seek to exclude these products from the coverage of
bindings in the current negotiations? There can be little justification for keeping these
products out altogether from binding commitments as it is difficult to foresee that in the
post reform era the Government of India would need to maintain complete freedom for
raising tariffs on them. Even maintaining the tariffs at the current high levels is difficult
to contemplate. It does not seem to be a good policy to maintain tariffs at the level of 20
per cent on a basic industrial raw material such as steel. In motor vehicles too it does not
make sense to continue with duties at the level of 60 per cent. Fish and fish products are
essential foodstuffs for a large segment of the population and there can be little
justification to maintain high levels of tariffs on these products. For steel the main issue is
giving time to the industry for restructuring. For motor vehicles there might be a need to
shelter newly established units from competition for a few more years. Both these
objectives can be accomplished neither by excluding them from bindings nor by
excluding them from the application of the agreed formula, but by seeking a longer
period of implementation.54
V.5  Tariff Peaks, High Tariffs, and Tariff Escalation
If the Swiss formula with the tariff average or any low figure as the coefficient is
accepted for the developed countries, the problem of peak tariffs, high tariffs, and tariff
escalation would get resolved in these countries without further effort. There could be a
problem if individual countries are allowed to make exceptions to the application of the
formula. As noted in Part II above, making exceptions to the application of the formula
has been the norm in the past negotiations, although participants have been required to
compensate through deeper reductions in other products. But this is not good enough
because invariably areas of interest to developing countries such as textiles, leather, and
consumer electronic products are left with high tariffs. One way to rectify the situation is
to insist that the selected formula must be applied without exception to all bound tariffs.
Of course the Chairman’s suggestion for mandatory tariff elimination in seven sectors of
interest to the developing countries would be another way to achieve the objectives as
high tariffs, peak tariffs and tariff escalation are prevalent particularly in textiles, leather
and consumer electronic products.
V.6  Base Rate and Base Date
There is normally no problem with regard to the base rate in respect of the tariff
lines that are already on a country’s schedule and are therefore bound. In these cases, the
bound rate is the base rate. In the current negotiations, some Members are proposing that
if the current applied rate is lower than the bound rate, the former should be the base rate.
This is a manifestly unfair proposition again from the point of view of the balance struck
at the end of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round. India must, therefore, firmly reject
this suggestion. The Chairman’s suggestion for making the Uruguay Round bound rate as
the base rate is based on past practice and is fundamentally sound.
Normally the rates bound during a round of multilateral trade negotiations are not
further reduced and bound before the next round of negotiations. But this has happened
after the Uruguay Round and in his submission (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1) the Chairman has
noted seven notifications by Members containing such reduced binding commitments.55
India too made substantial commitments in the area of textiles and clothing. In the tariff
lines in which the Uruguay Round bindings were further reduced and bound, according to
the Chairman’s suggestion the base rate would be the Uruguay Round bound rate. This
also is a fair suggestion. To give one example, in HS 520411 (Sewing thread), the
Uruguay Round bound rate was 40 per cent. This was further reduced to 20 per cent and
bound with effect from 1. 1. 2005. In this case, according to the Chairman’s suggestion,
the base rate for the Doha Round would be 40 and not 20 per cent.
The question of base date and base rate in respect of unbound tariff lines is more
troublesome. In the Tokyo Round, disagreements on the issue could not be resolved and
it was left to each country to determine its own base rate/date. In the Uruguay Round,
September 1, 1986 was agreed as the base date for unbound tariffs, as the meeting to
launch the negotiations had taken place in that month. But the manner in which the
developing countries made their contribution to tariff commitment ensured that this base
rate did not become relevant for them.  In the current negotiations we have already noted
the suggestion of the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee that in the case of unbound
rates the base rates would be two times the applied rate in 2001. We have dealt above
with the proposals made for base rates in two situations, viz. where the tariff lines were
bound during the Uruguay Round or earlier and where they remained unbound at the
commencement of current negotiations. There can be a third situation as well, where the
tariff line was not bound during the Uruguay Round, but a binding commitment was
made before the commencement of the current round. This happened in India’s case in
several textile products in which, during bilateral negotiations with the EC and the US in
1995, it agreed to reduce and bind tariffs. For such cases the Chairman has proposed that
“two times the MFN applied rate or the new bound rate, whichever is higher, for the year
the liberalisation took place would be the basis” for the determination of the base rate.
This is also a pragmatic suggestion that is also fair to the Members that have taken the
autonomous liberalisation measure. If this suggestion is accepted, India would get
somewhat greater flexibility in the application of the Chairman’s formula to the textile
items, as at the time India undertook the post-Uruguay Round commitment, the applied
rate on many textile tariff lines was 65 per cent or above. Applying the Chairman’s56
formula (with B=1) the new rate on tariff lines in which the applied rate in 1995 was 65
per cent would be in the vicinity of 27 per cent. The situation is however complicated by
the fact that most of India’s textile tariffs have an alternative specific component as well.
Another complication arises from the fact that although India agreed to the new bindings
bilaterally in 1995, it notified the bindings in 1999, when the applied rate was
substantially lower.
V.7  Implementation Period and Staging
In the Tokyo Round, there was agreement on eight years being the norm for
implementing the agreed reductions, while in the Uruguay Round there was agreement on
five years. Departures from this norm were agreed for specific areas. In general,
developing countries took longer to implement the agreed tariff reduction. In the Doha
Round, there appeared initially to be some convergence on accepting five years as the
norm, but the Chairman has refrained from giving any suggestion on the time frame.
There seems to be agreement on a longer time frame for implementation by the
developing countries.  India could accept five years as the norm, but press for developing
countries being allowed a longer period of up to 10 years at least for sensitive products.
This would give us a longer period in respect of industries that are not internationally
competitive at present.  A longer time frame would give additional time to the steel
industry for restructuring and to the motor vehicles industry to get fully established.
V.8  Non Ad Valorem Duties
Non ad valorem duties are not as hot an issue in the negotiations on market access
for non-agricultural products as they are in agricultural products. Such duties, whether in
the nature of specific or compound duties, cause concern because of the lack of
transparency. More importantly, specific duties have the effect of impeding the imports
of cheaper products as the ad valorem incidence varies inversely with the unit value. In
India both the  Jha (1983) and  Chelliah (1992-93) committees on tax reform had
suggested the conversion of non-ad  valorem into ad  valorem duties on efficiency
considerations.57
In the major markets, non ad valorem duties are not known to have a significant
impact on non-agricultural products of export interest to us. Moreover, India introduced
specific customs duties as an alternative to ad  valorem duties (on the basis of the
condition ‘whichever is higher’) on many textiles and clothing products, in the context of
reduction of duties on these products. These tariffs were intended to provide an important
safeguard for imports from low cost producers such as China.
The Chairman of the Negotiating Committee has proposed the conversion to ad
valorem equivalent of all non-ad valorem tariffs. There is likely to be resistance to this
from such Members as Switzerland, which rely considerably on such tariffs.   India
should not take a high profile on the issue of non ad valorem tariffs.  In the unlikely event
of consensus emerging in favour of conversion, India could ask for a time-limited
exemption for developing countries. This would enable it to retain the textiles tariff
regime at least for a limited period.
V.9  Special and Differential Treatment
In past negotiations, India and other developing countries have relied a great deal
on the concepts of 'non-reciprocity' and 'special and differential treatment'. The concept
served the developing countries well in the past when the objective of these countries was
to fend off pressures for undertaking commitments to reduce tariffs. In fact, they made
hardly any worthwhile tariff commitments in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. Their
contribution was better in the Uruguay Round but not enough to secure concessions from
the developed countries in critical areas. The concept can be of little use when the
objective is to secure reduction of tariff in the developed countries in products of export
interest to developing countries. The utility of the concept of non-reciprocity as a
bargaining tool for wresting concessions from the industrialised countries is extremely
limited. The idea should be to tempt those countries with worthwhile offers into making
concessions in return, rather than attempting to harangue them into reducing their duties
on the basis of arguments about less than full reciprocity. This is all the more necessary
because most of the products of export interest to the developing countries on which tariff
barriers are still high are considered sensitive in those countries and the governments58
need something more than arguments to appease domestic protectionist interests. Since
many developing countries did not make worthwhile tariff concessions in the past they
have considerable accumulated reserves of concessions, which they could trade away
during the current negotiations. It is not being suggested that India must not ask for
special and differential treatment in the Doha Round. Some good suggestions have been
made for special and differential treatment and we have referred to them above. Rather
the suggestion is that India should ask for modest benefits under the rubric of special and
differential treatment, such as what has been proposed above in this part of the paper.
VI  Conclusions
India’s continuing tariff reform gives India a tremendous bargaining ability in
securing such tariff reduction from its trading partners, and India must be ready to use
this ability in the Doha Round.  Having reduced its import duties on non-agricultural
products considerably from the level at which it had bound them in the Uruguay Round,
and not having undertaken any binding commitment on 30 per cent of its tariff lines,
India has a large repertoire of potential tariff concessions that it can offer in exchange for
obtaining reciprocal concessions in multilateral trade negotiations. The wave of regional
economic integration that is sweeping across the world and the fact that India has not
received an invitation from any major industrialised economy to link up with them
through such an arrangement provides another reason that should impel India to action in
multilateral trade negotiations. The only option for non-preference receiving countries is
to join in a multilateral endeavour to inject into the world trading system a strong dose of
non-discriminatory trade liberalisation. Success in this endeavour would erode the
preferential margin and alleviate the trade diversion potential of preferential
arrangements. The stand that is proposed for specific aspects are summarised below:
￿  India can agree to, and in fact must press for the formula approach to be the
core modality. And the formula to be preferred must be a non-linear
harmonization formula such as the Swiss formula and not a linear formula as
only a non-linear formula can reduce higher tariffs by a greater percentage.
Equally importantly the coefficient must be linked to the tariff average of the59
individual country concerned as this is a good way of taking into account the
dependence of high tariff developing countries on import tariffs for their
revenues and at the same time to achieve tariff compression.
￿  Against the background of minimal contributions having been accepted from
the developing countries in the past it would be reasonable for India to press
for a differentiated formula, envisaging lower tariff cuts, to apply to the
developing countries.  Better still, such differentiation must be endogenised in
the formula as can be accomplished by taking the tariff average of individual
countries into account in the formula.
￿  India must maintain the stand that the agreed formula must be applied to all
bound tariffs without exception as this is the only way in which it can be
ensured that the experience of the past rounds is not repeated and the products
of interest to the developing countries are not left out. Only by disallowing
exceptions can India obtain a reduction of peak and high tariffs on which it
has stressed so much in past discussions. It follows that India too must be
willing to bring all products within the coverage of bindings. In the post-
reform era India is unlikely to want to maintain tariffs at such high levels on
any product that it should want to avoid binding it altogether.
￿  The Chairman’s proposal for  sectorial elimination of tariff on a mandatory
basis is attractive to India as an exporting country. But the modality would
have problems for it as its application would result in negative protection in
the case of finished products in some of the sectors. In order for the proposal
to be acceptable developing countries must be allowed to maintain tariffs at
the level of 5 per cent. The same pattern of commitments could be acceptable
if the non-mandatory sectorial approach is to be followed.
￿  India must be ready to supplement the formula approach by request–offer
procedures for seeking deeper tariff reduction than what the formula delivers
in products in which it has principal or substantial supplier interest in its
trading partners.60
￿  India’s first position must be that unbound tariff lines must be out of the
purview of the application of the agreed formula and subject only to
negotiations on a request-offer basis.  However, India could accept the
application of the formula to these tariff lines if a reasonable allowance is
made for the fact that the unbound tariff lines were not a part of the balance
that was struck in the Uruguay Round, and credit is given as well for
autonomous liberalization since then.  These conditions are met to a large
extent in the proposals made by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group before
the Cancun Meeting. Bringing in unbound tariffs within the purview of the
formula would cause some problems for India as the current applied levels of
tariffs would have to be brought down considerably on fish and fish products,
iron and steel and motor vehicles. However, economic good sense dictates
that tariffs on these products must fall in line with the prevailing general rate
in other products. The special needs of the industry such as restructuring in the
iron and steel sector can be provided for by securing a longer implementation
period.
￿  For bound tariffs, the base rate must be the level at which the binding was
made in the Uruguay Round. For unbound tariffs, India must press for the rate
prevailing in April 1994 to be the bound rate. The Chairman’s suggestion for
the base rate for unbound lines to be two times the applied rate in 2001 is also
an effective way for giving credit for autonomous liberalization. The
Chairman’s suggestion for the base rate in the case of items that were not
bound in the Uruguay Round but were bound before the current round (two
times the applied level at the time of binding or the bound rate, whichever is
higher) is also fair and pragmatic.
￿  India can accept five years as the norm for implementation of the agreed
reductions but must press for the norm for developing countries to be ten
years.61
￿  India need not adopt a high profile on the issue of non-ad valorem tariffs.  If
there is an emerging consensus in favor of the conversion India should try to
secure a time-limited exemption for developing countries.
￿  The issue of special and differential treatment should be used with discretion
The idea should not be to make the contributions of India and other
developing countries minimal because in the ultimate analysis, meaningful
reciprocal concessions are politically imperative for the major developed
countries to make substantial concessions. The concept of special and
differential treatment could help to a modest extent in lightening the burden of
commitments that India may have to undertake. However, it would be a
mistake to depend upon it too much. In the past the concept served India well
as in the days of high tariffs it helped in fending off pressures for reduction of
tariffs. However, it is a poor bargaining instrument for eliciting concessions
from the industrialised countries.62
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